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Abstract We conduct a field experiment to show that discrimination in the rental
market represents a significant obstacle for the residential mobility of immigrants and
contributes to the ethnic residential segregation observed in large cities. We employ
the Internet platform to identify vacant rental apartments in different areas of the two
largest Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona. We send emails showing interest in the
apartments and signal the applicants’ ethnicity by using native and foreign-sounding
names. We find that, in line with previous studies, immigrants face a differential treat-
ment when trying to rent an apartment. Our results also indicate that this negative
treatment varies considerably with the share of immigrants in the area. In neighbor-
hoods with a scarce presence of immigrants the response rate is 30 percentage points
lower for immigrants than for natives, while this differential decays towards zero as
the immigration share increases. This evidence indicates that discriminatory practices
may perpetuate the spatial segregation of minority groups.
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1 Introduction
Upon arrival to a new country immigrants often settle in segregated neighborhoods.
Ethnic networks are useful to find a job and facilitate the adjustment to the new society
(Bartel 1989; Zavodny 1997; Jaeger 2000; Bauer et al. 2002, 2005). As the newcomers
or their descendants assimilate—find a steady job, accumulate some wealth and form
families—they may be willing to move out of the ethnic enclave. A different address in
a less segregated neighborhood may signal that the immigrant family has economically
and socially improved (Logan and Alba 1993; South and Crowder 1998; Fong and
Wilkes 1999; Freeman 2000). However, a well-established empirical regularity is
that immigrants in advanced societies tend to live spatially concentrated within large
cities; see Bartel (1989), Alba and Nee (1997), Borjas (1998) and Freeman (2002) for
examples in the US and Musterd (2005), Phillips (1998), and Bolt and van Kempen
(2010) for Europe.
The most common theories to explain the formation of ethnic enclaves are based
on the fact that immigrants prefer living near people with similar tastes and who
speak the same language (Cutler et al. 1999). Hence, the concentration of immigrants
in particular areas is demand driven. However, it has also been suggested that the
native’s behavioral response towards immigration may contribute to the surge of eth-
nic enclaves (Card et al. 2008; Saiz and Wachter 2011). The literature has identified
two main mechanisms. First, natives may be willing to move to all-native neighbor-
hoods and pay a premium to avoid immigrants (decentralized discrimination). Second,
natives can find ways to effectively restrict immigrant location choices to certain areas
(centralized discrimination).
Several studies have documented an important degree of discrimination against
minorities in the rental housing market of both the US and Europe. Most of those
studies conduct field experiments based on written applications to vacant apartments.
For example, Carpusor and Loges (2006) make enquiries via email regarding available
apartments in the US. They signal ethnicity through Arabic, African-American or
European sounding names and find that Arab and African-American applicants receive
significantly fewer responses than their white counterparts. Similar studies have been
conducted for Italy (Baldini and Federici 2011), Sweden (Ahmed and Hammarstedt
2008; Ahmed et al. 2010) and Spain (Bosch et al. 2010). All these papers report an
important degree of discrimination against the minority group.
Another important finding is that discrimination against immigrants or racial
minorities does not decrease with the quality of the applicant. In Bosch et al. (2010) and
Ahmed et al. (2010) applicants from different ethnic backgrounds are discriminated
relative to their native counterpart despite signaling a favorable employment career
and socioeconomic background. This result suggests that discrimination is driven by
natives’ preferences (i.e. taste based discrimination) rather than a lack of information
about the reliability of the minority group (i.e. statistical discrimination).
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The current paper investigates whether these discriminatory practices contribute
to the high degree of residential segregation observed in large cities. The existing
evidence has produced mixed results regarding the geographical variation of ethnic
discrimination. For the US, there is evidence that discrimination against African-
Americans is more severe in neighborhoods that are 80 to 95 % whites (Yinger 1986;
Page 1995; Hanson and Hawley 2011). In contrast, Auspurg et al. (2011) find that in
Germany discrimination against Turkish applicants increases with the proportion of
foreigners living in the neighborhood.
Our experiment is conducted in different neighborhoods of the two largest Spanish
cities (i.e. Madrid and Barcelona). Spain is a country with a fairly recent history of
international immigration. The number of residents born abroad grew from 1 mil-
lion in 1996 to 6 million in 2008 out of a total population of 46 million. While the
labor market impact of this supply shock seems to be negligible, the immigration
episode has reshaped the ethnic composition of Spanish cities.1 Bosch et al. (2010)
have documented a substantial degree of discrimination in the Spanish rental market
mainly driven by natives’ preferences against immigrants. Another characteristic of the
Spanish native population is its low degree of geographical mobility.2 In this context,
discriminatory practices can be useful to restrict the location choices of immigrants
and thus preserve the desired ethnic composition of the neighborhood.
The level of segregation in Spanish cities is lower than in the US or other West-
ern and Northern European countries, however segregation has not disappeared as
immigrants’ stay in the country has lengthened.3 Residential ethnic segregation is
a complex phenomenon with different dimensions measured by a battery of indices
(Massey and Denton 1988). In this paper, segregation is defined at the general level,
as the overrepresentation of a particular group in some parts of a city and its under-
representation in others. We measure the overrepresentation of immigrants in an area
(i.e. neighborhood or census district4) by the share of foreign born residents with or
without Spanish citizenship.5
To isolate the effect that discriminatory practices have in determining residential
sorting we conduct a field experiment where native and immigrant candidates apply
to vacant rental apartments announced on the Internet. We employ Moroccan and
Spanish-sounding names in the applications to signal the ethnicity of the candidate.
1 Several studies analyze the economic impact of immigration in Spain and find no significant effect on
the wages and employment opportunities of natives (González and Ortega 2011; Carrasco et al. 2008).
2 The current rate of internal migration is less than 1 % despite the severe crisis that has hit the country
(Izquierdo et al. 2014).
3 See Fernández-Huertas Moraga et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the evolution of ethnic segre-
gation in Spain.
4 Residential or spatial segregation can be measured at different levels. Figures at the street or block level
are useful to find out the relation between neighborly contacts but they are almost never available. Figures
at the neighborhood level refer to the direct living environment of an individual household. Daily shopping
often takes place in the neighborhood and young children go to primary school there. Larger levels of
aggregation may not be very meaningful as they may hide important differences within areas.
5 The share of foreign born in the neighborhood has been employed in previous studies to conduct empirical
studies on the spatial segregation of immigrants (see, for example, Card et al. 2008; Hanson and Hawley
2011).
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By nationality the most numerous groups of immigrants come from Romania (14.2 %),
Morocco (12.7 %), Ecuador (7.4 %) and Colombia (5.2 %).6 We restrict our analy-
sis to Moroccan immigrants as their names, as opposed to those of Ecuadorians and
Rumanians, are clearly distinguishable from those of natives. We then compare the
response rate differentials between native and Moroccan applicants across areas with
different concentration of immigrants to identify the extent to which rental hous-
ing discrimination represents a barrier for the geographical assimilation process. Our
results uncover a significant negative correlation between the immigration share in
a particular neighborhood and the degree of discrimination against Moroccan appli-
cants. That is, discrimination against immigrants is particularly intense in areas where
there are very few immigrants. In particular, the response rate to applications signed
with a Moroccan-sounding name is, on average, 18 percentage points lower than to
those signed by natives. However, in all-natives neighborhoods this differential would
increase up to 30 percentage points. As the share of immigrants increases the differ-
ential treatment decays. Accordingly where this share is around 30 %, immigrants
would be 14 percentage points less likely to be contacted than natives. Similar results
are obtained when the share of all immigrants is replaced by the share of only Moroc-
can immigrants. We also show that the geographical variation of discrimination is
not affected by the characteristics of flats (i.e. price or nationality of the owner) or
that of the applicants (i.e. gender or occupation), reinforcing the view that discrimina-
tory practices are mainly driven by negative attitudes towards immigrants rather than
other economic reasons. Our findings strongly suggest that discrimination restricts
the residential choices by immigrants and contributes to preserve the desired ethnic
composition of neighborhoods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the char-
acteristics of the housing market and the geographical distribution of immigrants in
Spain, Sect. 3 describes the experimental setup, Sects. 4 and 5 discusses our main
results and some conclusions follow in Sect. 6.
2 Immigration in Spain
The immigration episode in Spain began in the late 1990’s. Over a period of 10 years,
the share of foreign born population shifted from 3 % in 1996 to 14 % in 2008. As
a result of the international financial crisis, that has severely hit Spain, the stock of
immigrants has remained fairly constant from 2008 to 2011 and slowly decreased
since then. Immigrants represent a 13 % of the total population in January 2013. This
enormous inflow of immigrants have changed the ethnic composition of the country.7
Immigrants are unevenly distributed across Spain. Regions in the Mediterranean
coast, the Canary and Balearic Islands and the province of Madrid have received
the bulk of immigration. In 2008 these regions account for the 53 % of the native
population in Spain and the 75 % of the immigrant one (Fernández-Huertas Moraga
6 Source: Spanish Statistical Office, Local Population Registry, 2009.
7 Our definition of immigrant is a foreign born individual living in Spain, with or without Spanish citizen-
ship.
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et al. 2009). Economic reasons and network effects seem to be responsible for this
regional concentration (Farré et al. 2011; González and Ortega 2013). Immigrants are
more likely to be in urban than in rural areas and within cities the degree of segregation
is not negligible (Fernández-Huertas Moraga et al. 2009; Ballester and Vorsatz 2014).
This paper focuses on the two major Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona. The
reasons for this choice are twofold. First, those are the only two cities with a magnitude
comparable to that of other international studies (i.e. 3.2 million residents in Madrid
and 1.6 million in Barcelona in 2008). Second, the share of immigrants in each city is
around 20 % in 2008, well above the country average of 14 %.
The level of residential ethnic segregation in Spain is lower than in the US and other
Northern and Western European countries, and has remained fairly constant during
the last decade. At the national level, segregation measured by the dissimilarity index
slightly decreased from 0.41 to 0.37 between 2001 and 2008. In big cities, segregation
is higher but presents a similar pattern: the dissimilarity index decreased from 0.55
to 0.50 in Barcelona and from 0.50 to 0.45 in Madrid. Despite the slight decrease
in segregation, immigrants tend to be overrepresented in certain areas within cities.
Figures 1 and 2 display the share of immigrants in the different census districts in
Madrid and Barcelona for 2008 (see also Tables 6, 7 in the Appendix).8 For example,
in downtown Madrid the share of immigrants in 2008 was 31 %, while it was less
than 15 % in the residential areas located in the north of the city (see Fig. 1; Table 6).
Differences in immigrant concentration across districts are even more pronounced in
Barcelona (see Fig. 2; Table 7).
Spain hosts immigrants from a variety of ethnic origins. The bulk of the immigra-
tion flow, however, comes from Latin America (30 %), Eastern Europe (20 %) and
North Africa (13 %). Because we employ the soundness of the name to signal eth-
nicity, our experimental study focuses only on Moroccan immigrants whose names
are clearly distinguishable from those of natives. Given the geographical proximity
between Morocco and Spain, this group already represented a substantial share of the
foreign born population at the beginning of the immigration boom. By 2008, they were
still one of the most popular minority groups accounting for almost the 13 % of all
immigrants. Their spatial distribution does not exhibit important differences relative
to that of other groups. According to the results in Fernández-Huertas Moraga et al.
(2009) the dissimilarity index at the metropolitan area level oscillates between 0.3
and 0.5 for Moroccans, Ecuadorians and Rumanians during the whole immigration
episode. Tables 6 and 7 also display the share of Moroccan immigrants by census
districts in 2008. They are clearly overrepresented in certain areas such as downtown
Barcelona and the Usera district in Madrid.
In this paper we focus on the presence of discrimination in the private rented housing
market.9 According to Rubio (2014), in 2008 rental dwellings in Spain represented
8 There are 10 census districts in Barcelona and 21 in Madrid. The census districts are geographical
subdivisions created for the collection of statistical data. Their average population size is 155,780 inhabitants,
with a standard deviation of 56,569, a minimum of 43,951 and a maximum of 265,866. Source: Spanish
Local Population Registry.
9 The size of the social rented sector in Spain is only 1 %, therefore the total sector is almost private rented
sector.
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Fig. 1 Immigrant share by census districts in Madrid
about 15 % of the total stock of houses while the rental share in Europe was 33.2 % on
average. The size of the private rented sector is larger in Madrid (17 %) and Barcelona
(29 %). Despite its relatively small size, immigrants are overrepresented in the rental
sector because they lack the financial resources to buy real estate. According to the
National Immigrant Survey 2007 (ENI 2007), 64 % of the respondents lived in private
rented dwellings. These figures are slightly higher in Madrid (68 %) and Barcelona
(67 %).
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Fig. 2 Immigrant share by census districts in Barcelona
In some countries the presence of public housing in the stock of dwellings has
affected the level of ethnic segregation (see for example, Giffinger 1998 in Austria,
Goodchild and Cole 2001 in the UK). The share of public housing in Spain is less than
2 %, thus its impact on segregation (if any) is likely to be negligible.10
10 In the National Immigrant Survey 2007 (ENI 2007) less than 1 % of the respondents report to be in
social housing.
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From the previous discussion, it is clear that the private rental housing market is
the relevant one to investigate immigrants’ residential mobility decisions. Within this
market we restrict the attention to private landlords. We exclude from the analysis
dwellings rented by real estate agents, as they may receive several emails within our
experiment and distort the results. Also, when including real state agents in the analysis
it is not clear whether we are capturing their attitudes towards immigrants or that of
their clients.
3 Experimental design
Our experimental design is similar to that in other studies that have attempted to
identify discrimination in the rental housing market (Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2008;
Ahmed et al. 2010; Bosch et al. 2010). Next we briefly summarize our strategy and
highlight the main differences with respect to previous approaches.
We use the email correspondence testing method to examine the chances of
natives and immigrants to rent a flat in areas with different presence of foreign born
population. Written applications are sent to rental vacant apartments advertised on
www.idealista.com, which is the leading real estate website in Spain.11 On this plat-
form, private owners and real estate agencies can advertise properties for sell or rent.
For private owners, the first ad is free of charge. Fees for agencies start at a minimum
of 79 Euros per month. In contrast, individuals interested in a particular housing unit
can send an electronic application containing the name, email address and a short
message at no cost.
In our experimental setup, the potential tenants applied to all rental ads published
by private owners on idealista.com between December 2009 and June 2010. For each
housing unit, the site contains information on the rental price per month, the exact
address, the number of rooms, the size in squared meters and, in most cases, the
name and, therefore, the gender of the person placing the ad. Each week, we collected
information on available flats on Tuesdays and sent the applications on the next day.
One week later we recorded whether emails sent by the fictitious applicants received
a response. Those candidates invited to visit the apartment or to provide additional
information politely declined the invitation.
Common native and Moroccan-sounding names are used to signal the ethnicity
of the candidate. Based on name frequency data provided by the Spanish National
Statistics Office (http://www.ine.es), we select the most popular Spanish male names
(Manuel, Antonio, José and Juan) and female names (Ana, Isabel, Carmen and María)
and the four most common Spanish surnames (García, González, Fernández and
Rodríguez). We also use the most common Moroccan names for males in Spain
(Mohamed, Ahmed, Rachid and Youssef), the most common for females (Rachida,
11 According to this website almost 50 % of people in Spain use the Internet to search for housing. During
2011 idealista.com was one of the 50 webpages more visited in Spain and the only property advertising site
that appears in this ranking. Popular press such as The New York Times, The Telegraph, The Wall Street
Journal and The Washington Post, identifies idealista.com as the largest Spanish online property advertising
site (http://www.idealista.com/pagina/ranking).
123
SERIEs (2015) 6:129–152 137
Aicha, Naima and Khadija) and the four most common Moroccan surnames (El Idrissi,
Mohamed, Saidi and Serroukh).12
Applicants use email accounts which have been created from three different
providers: gmail, hotmail and yahoo. For example: carmen.garcia1969@yahoo.com;
mohamed_ahmed@gmail.com or rachidamohamed22@hotmail.com.
Previous studies show that information about the socioeconomic characteristics of
the candidates affect discriminatory practices. Accordingly, we send emails containing
different amount of information about the occupation of the candidate. We consider
two types of candidates: (1) an applicant who sends an email showing interest in the
flat and without any information other than the name; (2) an applicant whose email
contains information about his/her highly reliable job and therefore represents the
ideal tenant for property owners (i.e. university professor or banking clerk).
Our fictitious applicants sent the Spanish version of the following emails:
No information
“Hello,
I am interested in renting this apartment. I would be very grateful if you contacted
me. Thank you. NAME”
High-paying occupation
“Hello,
I am interested in this flat. I work as a financial analyst for a bank (La Caixa/Caja
Madrid). I have recently moved to the city (Barcelona/Madrid) and I am looking for a
flat where to live for at least a couple of years. I would be happy to provide a financial
guarantee. Please contact me if interested. Many thanks. NAME”
Or alternatively:
“Hello,
I am a Professor at the Department of Political Science of the University (Pompeu
Fabra/Carlos III de Madrid). I have been living in the city (Barcelona/Madrid) for a
couple of years and I would like to find a new apartment. I have a permanent contract
with the University. I am very interested in your flat and I would be very grateful if
you could contact me. Best regards. NAME”.
We create eight types of fictitious applicants: a Moroccan and a native, male and
female, candidates who do not provide information about their socioeconomic status,
and four more candidates (Moroccan and native, male and female) with information
about their occupations. We use a random assignment procedure, where each vacant
apartment is contacted by only one of the eight applicants. We apply to 1,186 apart-
ments, and each type of applicant applied, approximately, to 150 apartments. Our
experimental design based on written applications has the same two potential caveats
than the one in Bosch et al. (2010). That is, (i) sending an email may not be the most
common flat searching method, (ii) the correspondence test is not valid to detect dis-
crimination against immigrants whose names are similar to the native population. To
12 Notice that the third largest minority group in Spain are Ecuadorians that tend to have also Spanish
sounding names. Thus it could be that landlords assigned emails signed with a Spanish sounding name
to Latin-American immigrants, who also face an important degree of discrimination in the rental market
(Bosch et al. 2010). In this scenario, our estimated measure of discrimination would be underestimated and
we would be identifying a lower bound in the degree of discrimination against Moroccan applicants.
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circumvent these problems Bosch et al. (2010) conduct an audit study where trained
auditors from different nationalities make phone calls to rental properties and find
very similar results across nationalities and testing procedures.
The focus of this paper however is not on the average discrimination that immigrants
are subject to, but on how discrimination varies across different areas within cities.
From the Internet platform we obtain the complete address where each vacant flat is
located.13 We match this information with the share of immigrants obtained from the
Spanish Local Population Registry.14 In particular, we employ two levels of spatial
disaggregation at the city level: the census district and the ZIP or postal code, being
the latter a more disaggregated spatial subdivision.15 Barcelona and Madrid add up to
31 census districts and 90 ZIP codes.
The randomness in our experimental design ensures that both immigrants and
natives apply on average to similar apartments and hence, the differential treatment
that we observed is only attributable to the soundness of names. In order to check
the validity of our randomization exercise, we have computed the mean differences
(and standard errors) in flat characteristics between rental units contacted by natives
and immigrants. Results are available upon request. We do not find any systematic
differences in the type of flats that the two groups apply for.16
Despite the randomness of our design, the source of variation that we are exploiting
(i.e. the share of immigrants in the area) is not an exogenous variable. During the
searching process, immigrants and natives may apply at different rates to flats located
in areas with different concentration of foreigners. These different patterns may affect
the response of landlords to emails signed by candidates of a certain nationality just
because they are not used to their enquiries. It may also be that landlords in areas
with a low concentration of immigrants may afford not to deal with them as the pool
of potential native tenants is larger. As a result, our estimates do not have a causal
interpretation as part of the differential treatment captured may respond to variations
in the ethnic composition of the pool of applicants across neighborhoods.17
13 The websites used in previous studies to investigate rental market discrimination do not contain the
address of the housing units, hence it is not possible to conduct the type of analysis that we propose here.
14 The Registry is conducted at the municipality level and it provides a very accurate measure on the number
of immigrants, including the undocumented ones. The reason is that registration is required in order to have
access to public healthcare and education, but also to be eligible in the event of an amnesty. The process of
registration does not require proof of legal residence and the data are confidential (that is, cannot be used
to expel undocumented migrants). Thus immigrants have strong incentives to register.
15 While census districts are geographical subdivisions with statistical purposes, ZIP or postal codes are
smaller geographical areas designed to facilitate the postal service. Their average population size is 4,198
inhabitants, with a standard deviation of 9,647, a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 116,455. Source: Spanish
Local Population Registry.
16 Similar results are found at the ZIP code level.
17 Unfortunately this conjecture cannot be investigated as we do not have information on the characteristics
of the pool of applicants by neighborhoods.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
All Males Females No information
about occupation
High paying
occupation
Natives (%) 71.83a 72.85 70.81 65.48 74.94
No. obs. 600b 302 298 197 403
Immigrants (%) 53.75 46.74 60.68 41.88 59.49
No. obs. 586 291 295 191 395
a Percentage of applicants that receive an email back from the renter
b Number of emails sent
4 Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our experimental exercise.18 The first
column shows that the response rate for natives is almost 20 percentage points higher
than for Moroccans. Interestingly, as in previous studies (Ahmed et al. 2010; Bosch
et al. 2010), discrimination presents a clear gender pattern against males. Compared
to their native counterparts their response rate is 25 percentage points lower, while it
is 10 points lower for females. The table also suggests that the response rate increases
when positive information about the socioeconomic status of the applicant is revealed.
Finally, there is evidence that a reliable job reduces the response differential between
natives and immigrants: from 23.6 percentage points among those applicants without
information to 15.45 among those in high-paying occupations.
The main result of the paper is illustrated in Fig. 3. We plot, by ZIP code, the
response rate differential in favor of natives against the share of immigrants in that
particular ZIP code. Positive numbers in the y-axis indicate that emails signed with a
native-sounding name obtain a higher response rate than those signed with a foreign-
sounding one. The figure also displays the fitted values from regressing the response
rate differential on the share of immigrants, weighted by number of observations at the
ZIP level. Although, arguably, there is some noise in the data, a negative relationship
emerges, indicating that as the share of immigrants increases in a particular area rental
housing discrimination decreases. This evidence suggests that while many factors are
likely to be responsible for the geographical distribution of immigrants within cities,
the presence of artificial barriers to their residential choices may contribute to the
persistence of ethnic residential segregation in large cities.
We next estimate a set of econometric models to investigate the statistical signifi-
cance of the previous evidence. Let us first discuss the results for our baseline model.
Following previous studies we run a regression to estimate the probability of being
contacted (i.e. receiving a response email to the flat enquiry) as a function of a set of
socioeconomic characteristics including the applicant’s ethnicity:
Ci = β0 + β1Imgi + β2Femi + β3Infoi + β4(Femi × Imgi ) + β5(Infoi × Imgi )
+β6(Femi × Infoi ) + β7(Femi × Infoi × Imgi ) + ui
18 See also Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix which contain the descriptive statistics of the flats contacted.
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Fig. 3 Difference in response rates and ethnic segregation. Note The horizontal axis displays the share
of immigrants at the ZIP code level constructed from the registry data. The vertical axis displays the
differential treatment in favor of natives at the ZIP code level defined as the percentage of emails answered
to native applicants minus the percentage of emails answered to foreign candidates. The line corresponds
to a regression of the difference in response rates on the share of immigrants weighted by number of
observations at the ZIP level
where Ci is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the applicant is contacted and 0
otherwise; Imgi is an indicator that takes value 1 if the email is signed with a foreign-
sounding name; Femi is 1 for females and Infoi is a dummy variable that equals to
1 if positive information about the applicant’s occupation is provided in the email.
The model also includes interactions between the immigrant indicator and the gender
and information variables to unveil patterns of discrimination along those dimensions.
Finally, ui is an error term that given the experimental nature of our setup can be
assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
Table 2 displays the estimates of the baseline model. The estimates in the table cor-
respond to a linear probability model and the coefficients can be directly interpreted
as marginal effects.19 The first column shows the raw level of discrimination, where
the dependent variable in the previous equation is regressed only on the immigrant
indicator. Accordingly an email signed with a Moroccan-sounding name has 18 per-
centage points lower probability of getting and answer than an email signed with a
native-sounding one. Column (2) shows the results for the same regression but includ-
ing flat characteristics, such as price per squared meter, number of rooms and city
19 We have also estimated the models using non-linear estimation methods (i.e. logit and probit) and
the results, available upon request from the authors, are unaffected. This is not surprising given that the
percentage of zeros (ones) in the dependent variable is around 50 %. In this situation the non-linear models are
expected to generate marginal effects close to OLS because the underlying nonlinear conditional expectation
function is roughly linear in the middle (see, for example, Angrist and Pischke 2009).
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fixed effects. Given the experimental nature of our data, it is not surprising that our
results are unaffected by the inclusion of these controls. In column (3) we include as
additional regressors the gender dummy and its interaction with the immigrant indi-
cator. The coefficient on this interaction is positive, large in magnitude and highly
significant. The point estimate indicates that female immigrants are 15 percentage
points more likely to be contacted than their male counterparts. This is evidence of
the large penalty that male immigrants face in the rental housing market.
Next we study how the discriminatory behavior changes with the amount of infor-
mation disclosed in the application. The model in column (4) contains an informa-
tion dummy and its interaction with the immigrant indicator to capture differences
between “high-quality” candidates and those who do not provide any information on
their socioeconomic status. According to our estimates candidates signaling a high-
paying occupation are 8.6 percentage points more likely to be contacted than those
who do not report any information about their jobs. The interaction of this variable
with the immigrant indicator suggests the presence of some additional informational
premium for immigrants of around 8 percentage points, which is statistically insignif-
icant. Hence information does not eliminate the difference in response rate between
natives and immigrants.20 A similar result holds in column (5) when the gender dummy
and its interaction with the immigrant and the information indicator are included in
estimation.21
In all, the results in Table 2 confirm the previous findings in the literature. Property
owners use the informational content of names to differentially treat immigrants. This
differential treatment is substantially larger for males and it does not disappear when
information about the socioeconomic status of the candidate is revealed. This last
result indicates that either information other than the socioeconomic status is relevant
or that negative attitudes towards immigrants are behind the substantial amount of
discrimination observed in the rental market.22
Table 3 explores discriminatory practices across neighborhoods with different eth-
nic composition as measured by the share of immigrants. Column (1) displays the
estimates of the model for the raw level of discrimination including as additional
regressor the share of immigrants at the ZIP code level (ZIP-Img-Sharei ) interacted
with the immigrant indicator. The results indicate that in all-native areas immigrants
are on average 30 percentage points less likely to be contacted than natives. However
this differential decreases as the presence of immigrants in the area increases. In par-
ticular, a 10 percentage points increase in the immigration share at the ZIP code level
increases the chances of being contacted (relative to those of natives) by 5.5 percentage
20 The F-test for the hypothesis that information eliminates the gap in the response rate between natives
and immigrants (i.e. β1 + β5 = 0) takes a value of 20.12 with a p-value = 0.
21 The F-test for the hypothesis that information eliminates the response rate differential for males (i.e.
β1 +β5 = 0) takes a value of 20 with a p-value of 0. For females (i.e. β1 +β4 +β5 +β7 = 0) the F-test is
4.31 with a p-value of 0.038. In both cases, the null hypothesis for the absence of discrimination is rejected
at the 5 % level of significance.
22 See Bosch et al. (2010) for a deeper discussion about the effect of information on discrimination.
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points. Accordingly discrimination will disappear in areas where the concentration of
immigrants is around 50 %.23
The remaining columns in Table 3 investigate the robustness of the previous finding.
Column (2) adds ZIP code fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics that
may affect the probability of being contacted. Due to the experimental nature of our
design the results are unaltered. Column (3) investigates the effect of outlier observa-
tions. According to Fig. 3 one could think that our results are driven by those extreme
values. We estimate the model excluding the observations at the top and bottom 10 %
of the immigrant share distribution. While the relationship between discrimination
and immigrant share remains positive and significant, the point estimate increases to
1.23. This increase is mainly due to the substantial reduction in the variance of the
immigrant share across neighborhoods after excluding the extreme values. Column
(4) adds to the specification with all the observations the set of flat characteristics.
Again, the relationship between discrimination and immigrant concentration remains
unaffected. Column (5) includes the gender and the information dummy and their
interactions with the immigrant indicator. No significant changes affect our results.
Finally column (6) investigates whether the relationship between the share of immi-
grants and discrimination varies with the applicants’ characteristics. We do not find
evidence that the relationship varies with the gender or the quality of the applicant.24
A similar analysis can be conducted using the share of Moroccan immigrants at
the ZIP code level. The results are presented in Table 4. The point estimate on the
interaction between the share of Moroccan immigrants (ZIP-Moroccan-Sharei ) and the
immigrant indicator is larger, due to the smaller mean and variance of this variable.25
The point estimate suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of Moroccans
at the ZIP code level, increases the chances of response to an email signed by a
Moroccan applicant by 5 percentage points. This effect is large and reinforces the view
that while several factors may be responsible for the important overrepresentation of
immigrants in certain areas within cities, part of it is due to discriminatory practices in
the rental housing market. In particular, property owners through the Internet platform
seem to be effectively blocking the supply of housing units immigrants have access to.
5 Discussion
We now investigate the effect of a series of confounding factors that could threaten
the validity of our previous results. One possibility is that the quality (or price) of flats
in areas with few immigrants is different from that in other areas. Property owners
in high quality flats could discriminate more due to, for example, a higher level of
risk aversion. In this case, the characteristics of flats in a neighborhood would be
23 We have also estimated other functional forms including several polynomials of the variable ZIP-Img-
Share to explore a possible non-linear relationship between discrimination and the share of immigrants.
Our main conclusions do not change.
24 The results using a probit model instead of a linear probability model are extremely similar and are
available upon request.
25 The share of Moroccan immigrants in the sample has mean 1.14 and standard deviation 0.97. The share
of all immigrants in the sample has mean 22.05 and standard deviation 9.93.
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driving our results. We investigate this possibility in the first column of Table 5,
where we allow the coefficient on the interaction between the share of immigrants and
the immigrant indicator to vary by flat characteristics. None of those interactions is
statistically significant and our main result remains invariant, suggesting that the reason
for the observed spatial pattern is not that discrimination occurs in expensive/high-
quality flats that happen to be in areas where there are few immigrants.
The overrepresentation of immigrants that we observe in certain areas of Madrid
and Barcelona may also respond to the fact that owners in those areas are immigrants
themselves and less prone to discriminate against those of their own kind. However,
the immigration phenomenon in Spain is relatively recent and originates mainly from
low income countries. Hence, the home ownership rate among immigrants is relatively
low. According to the National Immigrant Survey 2007 (ENI 2007) this rate is around
30 %. Thus it is unlikely that our results are driven by a substantial share of immigrants
operating on the supply side. We can actually test this hypothesis with our data. We
have the name of approximately 80 % of the property owners or renters in our sample,
either because they were advertising it in the rental ad or because they would sign
the reply email. With this information we can infer the nationality of the owner and
test whether it is responsible for the observed discriminatory patterns. In our sample
85 % of all the owners (for which we have names) have a Spanish-sounding name.
We then compute the share of “non-Spanish” owners by ZIP code and interact it with
the immigrant indicator. The results for this specification appear in column (2) of
Table 5. We do not find any significant effect for this variable suggesting that our
results identify mainly the behavior of native owners.26
Finally, we discuss two possible channels that can explain the correlation between
discrimination and the share of immigrants in the area by studying the evolution of the
latter during the last decade. Information on the past distribution of immigrants within
cities is only available at the census district level, thus first we need to confirm our
previous finding at this higher level of aggregation. Column (3) in Table 5 presents the
estimates for our basic specification using the share of immigrants at the census district
level as explanatory variable. At this level, a 10 percentage points increase in the share
of immigrants is associated with a 6 percentage points increase in the probability that
an immigrant will be contacted. Thus our previous finding is reassured.
We now explore the relationship between the increase in the immigrant share in a
particular neighborhood and the current level of discrimination. We employ as explana-
tory variable the growth in the share of immigrants by district between 2000 and 2008
interacted with the immigrant indicator. Column (4) shows that there is a very strong
correlation. In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of immigrants in
one district is associated to a fall in discrimination of 0.85 percentage points. One
possible explanation for this result is that districts discriminating more in 2008 were
also over discriminating in 2000, thus generating a lower influx of immigrants. Alter-
natively, one could argue that immigrants moving into certain districts brought in new
26 In another specification we have also included a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the owner is
immigrant. Results, which are available upon request, show that this variable is only significant at 10 %
when interacted with the immigrant indicator. Nevertheless, the share of immigrants at the ZIP code level
(ZIP-Img-Sharei ) interacted with the immigrant indicator is still significant.
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information and increased acceptance of the foreign born population. Unfortunately
our data do not allow us to disentangle these two explanations.
On the whole, our results indicate that the degree of discrimination varies substan-
tially with the ethnic composition of the neighborhood. We find evidence that property
owners or renters discriminate more in areas with a lower share of immigrants. This
result is affected neither by the characteristics of flats (i.e. quality or nationality of the
owner) nor by those of the applicant (i.e. gender or socioeconomic status), which sug-
gests that discrimination is mainly driven by negative attitudes towards immigrants
rather than other economic reasons. Nonetheless our finding could also respond to
differences in the ethnic composition of the pool of applicants across neighborhoods.
If immigrants were more reluctant to apply to “native” neighborhoods, landlords in
those areas could afford a higher degree of discrimination as the pool of potential native
tenants would be larger. While the experimental setting does not allow us identifying
the forces behind discriminatory practices, our results allow us to conclude that those
practices are used to restrict the location choices of immigrants and thus preserve the
desired composition of neighborhoods.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we conduct a field experiment to show that discrimination against immi-
grants in the rental housing market is strongly correlated with their spatial distribution
in the two largest Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona. Our estimates indicate that in
areas with very few immigrants the differential in response rates between natives and
immigrants reaches a magnitude of 30 percentage points. As the share of immigrants
increases, this differential is reduced. In particular, a 10 percentage points increase in
the share of immigrants at the ZIP or postal code level increases the chances that an
immigrant will be contacted by the property owner or renter by 6 percentage points
(relative to their native counterpart). We also show that this spatial pattern does not
respond to differences in the quality and price of flats or the ethnic origin of the owners
across geographical areas.
These results do not allow us to conclude that discriminatory practices generated
the current distribution of immigrants across neighborhoods. Probably other factors,
like house prices and immigrants’ preferences to live close to each other played a
substantial role in shaping the spatial distribution we observed today. Nonetheless our
results show that, even if other forces would have been responsible for triggering ethnic
segregation, the discriminatory behavior of property owners and renters would have
created persistency once segregation started and thus restrict immigrants’ location
choices. Accordingly public intervention in the form of, for instance, social housing
could be desirable in order to redistribute immigrants across locations and contribute
to the geographical mobility of ethnic minorities.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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See Tables 6 and 7.
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